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Money Talks:
An Indigent Defendant's Right to an
Ex Parte Hearing for Expert Funding
Justin B. Shane*
I. Introducion
Jon is an indigent capital murder defendant, and the trial court has
appointed two attorneys to defend him. Jon swears that on the night of the
murder he was on the other side of the state with someone named Mike. After
Jon's attorneys file a motion with the court asking for funds to hire an
investigator to search for Jon's alibi, the court holds an open hearing with the
prosecution present to determine whether an investigator is necessary forJon's
defense.' Subsequently, the investigator's work reveals thatJon had asked Mike
to pose as an alibi, and consequently, Jon's attorney decides not to pursue an
alibi defense. A few weeks later, the prosecutor becomes suspicious as to why
the defense has not notified her of its intent to introduce an alibi at trial.2 The
prosecutor sends her own investigator to find Jon's alleged alibi and the
investigator is able to get a statement from Mike admitting that Jon had asked
him to pose as an alibi. At trial, months later, the jury convicts Jon based largely
on the evidence concerningJon's attempt to fabricate an alibi. IfJon had money
to hire his own investigator, he would not have disclosed his potential alibi
defense in the process of requesting funds for an investigator, and the
prosecution would have never located the false alibi. Alternatively, the
prosecutor would not have discovered Jon's attempt to fabricate an alibi had the
court permitted Jon to apply ex parte for investigative funds.
Virginia law does not require trial courts to permit indigent defendants to
apply ex parte for expert funding, rather, defendants must argue that an expert
or investigator would be necessary for their defense in open court with the
* J.D. Candidate, May 2006, Washington and Lee University School of Law; B.A., Univ-
ersity of Delaware, May 2003. The author would like to thank Professor David Bruck and the rest
of the Virginia Capital Case Clearinghouse for their edits and assistance. The author would also like
to thank all the attorneys that provided information for this article. Lastly the author would like to
thank his family and Cristina for their love, humor, and patience.
1. See Husske v. Commonwealth, 476 S.E.2d 920, 925-26 (Va. 1996) (explaining the
showing defendants must make in order to trigger their constitutional tight to a non-mental health
expert).
2. See VA. SUP. CT. R. 3A:11 (c)(2) (requiring the defense to give the prosecution notice if
it intends to introduce an alibi defense at trial).
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prosecution present.' Black's Law Dicionary defines ex parte as "[d] one or made
at the instance and for the benefit of one party only, and without notice to, or
argument by, any party adversely interested."4 Virginia is one of the few capital
jurisdictions in which statutory or case law does not permit defendants to apply
ex parte for expert funding or in which judges do not routinely allow ex parte
applications.5 In the American Bar Association's recent report on Virginia's
indigent defense system, the authors noted that they had "never encountered
such a persistent problem of indigent defendants' right to seek expert funds
being extinguished by a widespread practice of the courts of not allowing the
requests to be filed ex parte."6
When judges refuse to permit defendants to apply ex parte for expert
funding, they force indigent defendants to disclose potential defense strategies
and provide non-reciprocal accelerated discovery to the prosecution.7 Defense
attorneys must choose between applying for expert funding and safeguarding
confidential defense strategy.8 The choice may cause attorneys not to pursue
funds for an expert if they are unsure of the expert's value and would need to
disclose a large amount of potentially damaging information in order to prove
that the expert is necessary.9 Jon's case illustrates this problem. The next time
a defendant tells Jon's attorneys that he or she has an alibi, the attorneys may not
request funds to hire an investigator to locate the alibi unless they are sure that
the alibi is legitimate. Otherwise their request may ultimately lead the
prosecution to their client's false alibi. Forcing a defendant to decide whether
an expert is necessary at such an early stage in the proceedings burdens his right
to present a defense and places him at a major disadvantage when compared to
monied defendants.
3. THE SPANGENBERG GROUP, A COMPREHENSIvE REVIEW OF INDIGENT DEFENSE IN
VIRGINIA, 62-63 (2004), available at http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/downloads/
sclaid/indigentdefense/va-report2004.pdf [hereinafter VIRGINIA INDIGENT DEFENSE REPORT].
For the purposes of this article, "expert funding" will be used as a shorthand term for "expert and
investigative funding."
4. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 262 (8th ed. 2004).
5. See infra Part IV (surveying state practice regarding application for expert funding); see also
E-mail from Jonathan Shapiro, Attorney at Law, Alexandria, Va., to author (Jan. 26,2005,02:17 PM
EST) (on file with author) [hereinafter Shapiro] (explaining that he was unaware of any Virginia state
judge who permits ex parte application for expert funding).
6. VIRGINIA INDIGENT DEFENSE REPORT, supra note 3, at 63. The Spangenberg Group,
a research firm that specializes in indigent defense issues, conducted the study on behalf of the
American Bar Association. Id. at i.
7. See Donna H. Lee, In the Wake ofAke v. Oklahoma: An Indigent Criminal Defendant's Lack
ofEx Parte Access to Expert Services, 67 N.Y.U. L. REv. 154, 186-91 (1992) (discussing the prejudice
to defendants when courts do not permit them to apply ex parte for expert funding).
8. Shapiro, supra note 5.
9. See Lee, supra note 7, at 175 (noting that open hearings for expert funds require the
defendant to weigh the costs of revealing strategy and the benefits of obtaining expert assistance).
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This article contends that the Constitution entitles indigent defendants to
apply ex parte for expert funding. Part II examines Ake v. Oklahoma,'° which
held that in certain circumstances the state must provide an indigent defendant
with expert assistance." Part III analyzes the Supreme Court of Virginia's
opinions concerning the right to an ex parte hearing for expert assistance. Part
IV discusses current state and federal practice regarding applications for expert
assistance. Finally, Part V examines possible challenges to open hearings for
expert funding under the Fifth Amendment Self-Incrimination Clause, the Sixth
Amendment Assistance of Counsel and Compulsion Clauses, and the Fourteenth
Amendment Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses.
IL Ake: An Oveniew
A. The Cases Prior to Ake
In United States ex rel. Smith v. Baldi," the United States Supreme Court held
that the Constitution requires a court to appoint a psychiatrist only to evaluate
a defendant's sanity at the time of the offense and to testify to those findings at
trial, rather than to appoint a psychiatrist who will assist the defendant in
preparing his insanity defense. 3 In the years following Baldi, the United States
Supreme Court vastly expanded indigent criminal defendants' rights and held,
inter alia, that the state must provide at no cost trial transcripts for appellate
review and counsel at trial and on first appeal from conviction. 4 However, the
Court also clarified that the Fourteenth Amendment does not require states to
provide indigent defendants with the same services that a monied defendant
could purchase.'" The Court in Ross v. Moffid'6 limited the Due Process and
Equal Protection Clauses in holding that there is no constitutional right to
10. 470 U.S. 68 (1985).
11. See Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 83-84 (1985) (holding that when certain conditions
are met, due process requires the state to provide a defendant with at least one competent mental
health expert).
12. 344 U.S. 561 (1953).
13. United States ex rI/. Smith v. Baldi, 344 U.S. 561, 568 (1953).
14. See Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956) (holding that the state must provide at no
cost trial transcripts for appellate review to indigent defendants); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S.
335, 344 (1963) (holding that the state must provide indigent defendants with counsel at trial);
Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 357 (1963) (holding that the state must provide indigent
defendants with counsel on their first appeal as a matter of right).
15. See Douglas, 372 U.S. at 357 ("Absolute equality is not required; lines can be and are drawn
and we often sustain them.'). See general# Lee Richard Goebes, The Equa4y Prinpe Revisited: The
Relationshbo fDaubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals to Ake v. Oklahoma, 15 CAP. DEF.J. 1, 4-10
(2002) (providing an in depth discussion of the Court's holdings in Griffn and Douglas and the limits
of the Court's holdings in those cases).
16. 417 U.S. 600 (1974).
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counsel on a discretionary appeal. 7 The Court noted that the Constitution only
requires that states "assure the indigent defendant an adequate opportunity to
present his claims fairly in the context of the State's appellate process."'8
Although Ross was a step backward for the rights of indigent defendants, the
Court's jurisprudence had changed enough since 1953 to undermine the basis for
Baldi's holding.' 9
B. The Ake Opinion
In Ake, the trial court denied the capital murder defendant's request for a
court-appointed psychiatrist to evaluate his sanity at the time of the offense and
to assist him in preparing his insanity defense.' Due to the lack of expert
assistance, the jury heard no testimony on Ake's sanity at the time of the offense
and thereafter sentenced him to death.2' Justice Marshall, writing for the
Supreme Court majority, first noted that the consistent theme of the Court's
indigent defense cases had been to ensure that defendants have "[m]eaningful
access to justice."'  To implement that principle, the Court "focused on iden-
tifying the 'basic tools of an adequate defense or appeal' and ... required that
such tools be provided to those defendants who cannot afford to pay for
them."23 The Court applied the test from Mathews v. Eldtidge24 to assess whether
psychiatric assistance is a "basic tooln of an adequate defense or appeal" such
that the Due Process Clause requires courts to provide defendants with the
means to obtain a psychiatrist. 25 To determine if due process requires courts to
provide a given procedural protection, the Mathews test balances the private and
governmental interests involved as well as the risk of error and the value of
additional or substitute procedural safeguards.26
Applying Mathews, the Ake Court first determined that defendants have a
compelling interest in their lives and liberty.27 Moreover, the state's interest was
17. Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600,618-19 (1974).
18. Id. at 616.
19. See BalS, 344 U.S. at 568 (noting that the defendant received due process because a court-
appointed psychiatrist had examined him as to his sanity at the time of the offense).
20. Ake, 470 U.S. at 72.
21. Id. at 72-73.
22. Id. at 76-77.
23. Id. at 77 (quoting Britt v. North Carolina, 404 U.S. 226, 227 (1971)).
24. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
25. Ake, 470 U.S. at 77 (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976)); see Mathews,
424 U.S. at 324-25, 334-35 (assessing whether the Social Security Administration violated the
plaintiff's due process rights when it provided the plaintiff only with notice and the opportunity for
written comment after terminating the defendant's social security benefits).
26. Ake, 470 U.S. at 77 (citing Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335).
27. Id. at 78.
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limited because of the minor financial burden involved in providing defendants
with one competent psychiatrist.28 Further, the state did not have a compelling
interest in prevailing at trial; rather, its only interest was in providing a fair trial.
29
Regarding Mathews's third prong, the Court concluded that defendants risk
erroneous determinations of their sanity when they receive no psychiatric
assistance.30 Thus, the Court reversed Ake's conviction and sentence and held
that under certain circumstances the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment requires that the state provide indigent defendants with funds for
at least one competent psychiatrist.31 However, because the risk of erroneous
determination is only present when a defendant's sanity is at issue, the due
process requirement only comes into existence when a defendant shows that his
sanity at the time of the offense is likely to be a material issue at trial.32 Further,
the Ake Court held that due process requires the state to provide a capital
defendant with a psychiatrist when the State presents expert psychiatric
testimony regarding his future dangerousness at the sentencing phase of trial.33
Regarding the implementation of the right to psychiatric assistance, Justice
Marshall explained that defendants do not have the right to a psychiatrist of their
choice and the state must provide only one competent psychiatrist.-" Further,
the Court left the implementation of the right to the states.35 However, Justice
Marshall revealed his understanding of the procedure for implementing the right
when he noted that a psychiatrist should be appointed "[w]hen the defendant is
able to make an exparte threshold showing to the trial court that his sanity is
likely to be a significant factor in his defense." 36 In the same year that the Court
decided Ake, the Court in Caldwell v. Mississipp7 rejected a defendant's con-
tention that due process entitled him to a court-appointed criminal investigator,
ballistics expert, and fingerprint expert on the grounds that he had not shown
the trial court that any of the experts would be necessary to his defense.38
However, Justice Marshall implied that the Court might have favorably
28. Id. at 78-79.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 82.
31. Id. at 83-84, 86-87.
32. Ake, 470 U.S. at 82-83.
33. Id. at 83-84.
34. Id. at 83.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 82-83.
37. 472 U.S. 320 (1985).
38. CaldweU v. Mississippi, 472 U.S. 320, 323 n.1 (1985).
2005]
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considered the defendant's argument had the defendant made some showing of
necessity at trial."
III. Virginia's Treatment of Motions for Ex Parte Hearings
A. The Effects of Denying a Defendant an Ex Parte Hearing
The Virginia General Assembly partially codified Ake when it adopted
Virginia Code section 19.2-264.3:1. 0 Section 19.2-264.3:1 requires courts to
appoint a mental health expert if a defendant is charged with capital murder and
is unable to pay for one.4 1 The Supreme Court of Virginia in Commonwealth v.
Husske42 expanded Ake's holding to non-mental health experts' when it con-
cluded that due process requires "the appointment of non-psychiatric experts"
if the defendant shows that "the subject which necessitates the assistance of the
expert is 'likely to be a significant factor in his defense.' ,4 An indigent def-
endant satisfies "this burden by demonstrating that the services of an expert
would materially assist him in the preparation of his defense and that the denial
of such services would result in a fundamentally unfair trial."" Further, the
defendant "must show a particularized need. ' 4 Thus, a capital defendant
seeking a non-mental health expert, or a non-capital defendant seeking any type
of expert, must demonstrate that the particular expert sought would materially
assist the defense at trial and that the expert's absence would be prejudicial.46
Like Virginia, Texas uses the " 'likely to be a significant factor in his
defense' " standard to determine whether a court must grant a defendant's
request for expert funding.47 The Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas in
Williams v. State" noted that the showing requires counsel "to explain his theories
39. See id. ("We therefore have no need to determine as a matter of federal constitutional law
what if any showing would have entitled a defendant to assistance of the type here sought.").
40. See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.3:1 (Michie 2004) (providing capital defendants with the
right to a mental health expert when they cannot pay for one); Goebes, supra note 15, at 23-24
(listing Virginia as one of the many states that codified Ake).
41. See VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.3:1 (requiring courts to provide the defense with a
qualified mental health expert when a defendant is charged with capital murder and cannot pay for
expert assistance); Goebes, supra note 15, at 23-24 (noting that Virginia Code section 19.2-264.3:1
only applies to capital defendants seeking mental health experts).
42. 476 S.E.2d 920 (Va. 1996).
43. Husske, 476 S.E.2d at 925 (quoting Ake, 470 U.S. at 82-83).
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id.; see also Steven B. Bright, Obtaining Fund for Experts and Investigative Assistance, THE
CHAMPION, June 1997, at 32-33 (explaining what defendants must show in order to obtain expert
funding).
47. See Williams v. State, 958 S.W.2d 186,192 (rex. Crim. App. 1997) (quotingAke, 470 U.S.
at 82-83) (describing the showing that a defendant must make when applying for expert assistance).
48. 958 S.W.2d 186 (rex. Crim. App. 1997).
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and describe with some specificity how an expert would assist him."4 9 For
instance, in requesting a mitigation specialist or social worker, counsel should
describe to the court the area of mitigation they plan to investigate, the possible
weight of the evidence that may result, and how the expert will go about his or
her investigation.
50
In showing that an expert is necessary, defendants will reveal potential
defenses, witness names, and trial strategies and theories earlier than Virginia's
discovery rules require."' Further, Virginia's discovery rules do not require the
defense to turn over work-product information, attorney-client communications,
or possible defenses or experts that counsel consulted but do not plan to use at
trial.5 2 In showing necessity under Husske, however, attorneys may need to
disclose such information and, consequently, provide the prosecution with far
more than the discovery rules allow it. 3 Additionally, the prosecution is not
required to provide reciprocal information once the defense discloses
information at the open hearing for expert funds.54 Virginia capital defense
attorneys frequently find that the benefits of obtaining an expert do not
outweigh the risks in disclosing their strategies to the defense." For instance, the
attorneys for John Allen Muhammad faced this choice until they were able to
hire a mitigation expert with funds from another state's public defender office
that was also involved in the case.56 Other defendants are not so lucky and must
choose between maintaining the confidentiality of the defense effort and expert
funding.
57
49. Wiliams, 958 S.W.2d at 193.
50. Bright, supra note 46, at 32.
51. See VA. SUP. CT. R 3A:1l (c) (permitting the Commonwealth to obtain any written report
of scientific tests which the defense intends to proffer as evidence at trial or sentencing if the
defense requests similar information, notice of a defendant's intention to introduce an alibi defense,
and notice of intention to rely on an insanity defense); see alro VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-168 (Michie
2004) (requiring the defense to provide the prosecution with notice of an insanity defense twenty-
one days prior to trial); Tamara L. Graham, Death bv Ambush: A Pka for Discovery of Evidence in
Aggravation, 17 CAP. DEF.J. 321 (2005) (exploring Virginia's criminal discovery rule).
52. See VA. Sup. CT. R. 3A:11 (c) (requiring defendants to disclose scientific reports that they
plan to "proffer or introduce into evidence at trial or sentencing").
53. See Lee, sapra note 7, at 180 ("The disclosure that would occur in an Ake proceeding
would be of information that the defense was considering, but not necessarily intending to use at
trial.').
54. See O'Dell v. Commonwealth, 364 S.E.2d 491, 497 (Va. 1988) (determining that the
accused who was forced to disclose the identity of his experts when applying for funds for them
was not prejudiced by a lack of knowledge about the Commonwealth's experts and the substance
of their testimony).
55. VIRGINIA INDIGENT DEFENSE REPORT, supra note 3, at 63.
56. Shapiro, supra note 5.
57. VIRGINIA INDIGENT DEFENSE REPORT, supra note 3, at 63.
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Further, open-court hearings notify the prosecution that the defense plans
to hire a specific expert.5" Because Virginia's discovery rules require the defense
to disclose prior to trial the reports of any expert it intends to use at trial, the
prosecution will infer that an expert's studies were not favorable to the defense
if the prosecution requests expert reports that the defense plans to introduce at
trial and the defense does not turn over any reports from the expert for which
it had requested funds.5 9 For example, if a hair found on the victim's body is a
different color than that of the defendant, the prosecution may initially decide
the hair is not worth testing. If the defendant, however, retains an expert to test
the hair and the results identify it as the defendant's hair, the defense's failure to
disclose those tests to the prosecution prior to trial may induce the prosecution
to conduct its own tests and thereby uncover the incriminating evidence. Thus,
open hearings permit the prosecution to get a free look at potential theories of
the case while the defense experiments with its trial strategy.
When the defense applies for a mitigation expert, it will need to disclose the
number of interviews the mitigation expert will conduct, where the mitigation
expert will need to travel for the interviews, and potentially the names of the
people the mitigation expert will interview or their relation to the defendant. °
In every case, these revelations will direct prosecutors toward the specific people
the defense intends to introduce and allow prosecutors to focus their own
"counter-mitigation" investigation.6' Prosecutors generally believe that the
earlier they get to a defendant's family and friends, the more helpful to the State
they will be.62 For example, if the defense retains a mitigation expert to interview
the defendant's uncle concerning his past sexual abuse of the defendant, the
prosecution may be able to reach the uncle first and implicitly inform him that
the defense believes he is a sexual molester. This situation may cause the uncle
to become uncooperative with the mitigation expert because he does not want
to be labeled a sexual molester. If the defense asks for a mitigation expert to
investigate the defendant's social history for indicators of mental retardation, the
prosecution may be able reach members of the defendant's family first and
disclose the defense's plan to establish that the defendant is mentally retarded.
This technique may encourage the defendant's family and friends to give the
58. See State v. Apelt, 861 P.2d 634, 650 (Ariz. 1993) (noting that an ex parte hearing would
benefit an indigent defendant when an expert's analysis turns out contrary to what the defendant
had expected).
59. See VA. Sup. CT. R. 3A:1 1(c) (requiring the defense to disclose expert reports that it plans
to introduce at trial).
60. Bright, supra note 46, at 32.
61. David J. Novak, Anatomy of a Federal Death Penahy Prosecution: A Ptimerfor Prosecutors, 50
S.C. L. REv. 645, 671-73 (1999) (noting that the earlier prosecutors are able to get to the defense's
potential mitigation witnesses, the better).
62. Id. at 651.
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prosecution statements that minimize his disabilities so as to avoid the stigma of
mental retardation and to say something "positive" about him.
B. The CurrentArgument in Virginia Against Providing
Defendants with an Ex Parte Heanng
The Supreme Court of Virginia has rejected defendants' arguments that
there is a right to an ex parte hearing for expert funding but, in doing so, has
relied on case law that is no longer valid.63 The Supreme Court of Virginia in
O'Dellv. Commonwealthb upheld the trial court's denial of the defendant's request
to apply ex parte for funds to obtain a forensic expert to analyze blood and hair
samples found at the crime scene.6" The court cited two cases holding that
indigent defendants were not constitutionally entitled to certain non-psychiatric
experts and rejected O'Dell's claim because he "had no constitutional right
requiring the Commonwealth to provide funding of this type of expert
assistance. ,
66
Four years after O'Dell, the Supreme Court of Virginia, in Ramdass v.
Commonweath,67 rejected the defendant's claim that the trial court erred when it
denied his request for an ex parte hearing on funding for a medical doctor and
private investigator.6 Ramdass argued that an open hearing "violated his Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimination, his Sixth Amendment right to
confrontation, and his Fourteenth Amendment right to due process. '69 The
court based its decision on O'Dell.° One year after Ramdass, the Supreme Court
of Virginia, in Weeks v. Commonwealth,7' cited Ramdass and affirmed the trial
court's denial of the defendant's request for an ex parte hearing on funding for
pathology and ballistics experts because it had "already . . .decided that a
63. See 0 Dell, 364 S.E.2d at 499 (affirming the trial court's rejection of the defendant's
request for an ex parte hearing on funding for forensic experts); Ramdass v. Commonwealth, 437
S.E.2d 566, 571 (Va. 1993) (concluding that there is no constitutional right to an ex parte hearing
for funding for a medical doctor and private investigator); Weeks v. Commonwealth, 450 S.E.2d
379,388 (Va. 1994) (stating that a capital defendant is not entitled to an ex parte hearing for funding
for a pathology and a ballistics expert).
64. 364 S.E.2d 491 (Va. 1988).
65. O'Dell, 364 S.E.2d at 498-99.
66. Id. at 499; seeTownes v. Commonwealth, 362 S.E.2d 650,664 (Va. 1987) (concluding that
the defendant had no constitutional entitlement to an identification expert); Gray v. Common-
wealth, 356 S.E.2d 157, 166 (Va. 1987) (concluding that defendants have no constitutional entide-
ment to a publicly paid investigator or public funds to secure certain statistical reports).
67. 437 S.E.2d 566 (Va. 1993).
68. Ramdass, 437 S.E.2d at 571.
69. Id.
70. Id. (citing O'Del, 364 S.E.2d at 499).
71. 450 S.E.2d 379 (Va. 1994).
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defendant charged with capital murder is not entitled to an ex parte hearing on
his motion for expert assistance.
72
In sum, the Supreme Court of Virginia has relied on O'Delleach time it has
specifically rejected a defendant's request for an ex parte hearing for expert
assistance. 3 O'Dellin turn upheld a denial of a motion for an ex parte hearing
only because there was no constitutional right to a non-psychiatric expert.74
Subsequent to O'Dell, Husske recognized that appointment of non-psychiatric
experts is constitutionally compelled when the defendant shows that an expert
is " 'likely to be a significant factor in his defense.' ,7' Thus, the restrictive
reading of Ake on which O'Dell rested is no longer valid in light of Husske.76
Consequently, Ramdass and Weeks are based on invalid case law and trial courts
should not deny requests for ex parte hearings based solely on those decisions.
This conclusion leads to the question of whether the Constitution does create
a right to ex parte hearings.
IV. Overiew of Current State and Federal Practices
A. Statutes and Case Law Providing the Right to Ex Parte Application for Expert
Funds
The federal government and the American Bar Association have recognized
that courts should permit defendants to apply ex parte for expert funding.77 The
Criminal Justice Act of 1964 permits indigent federal defendants "to obtain
investigative, expert, or other services necessary for adequate representation [by]
request[ing] them in an ex parte application. 7 8 Various state courts have cited
this standard in holding that defendants have a right to apply ex parte for expert
72. Weeks, 450 S.E.2d at 388.
73. See Ramdass, 437 S.E.2d at 571 (deciding that Ramdass gave no reason for the court to
depart from O'Del; Weeks, 450 S.E.2d at 388 (basing its rejection of the defendant's motion for an
ex parte hearing on funding for expert assistance on Ramdass).
74. O'Dell, 364 S.E.2d at 499.
75. Husske, 476 S.E.2d at 925 (quoting Ake, 470 U.S. at 82-83).
76. Compar id. (holding that under certain circumstances defendants have a constitutional
entitlement to non-psychiatric expert assistance), with O'Dell, 364 S.E.2d at 499 (concluding that the
defendant was not entitled to an ex parte hearing because he had no constitutional tight to a
forensic expert).
77. See 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(e)(1) (2000) (providing defendants with the right to ex parte
applications for expert funds); A.B.A. GUIDELINES FOR THE APPOINTMENT AND PERFORMANCE
OF DEFENSE COUNSEL IN DEATH PENALTY CASES, § 10.4 cmt. (Rev. Ed. 2003) [hereinafter ABA
GUIDELINES] (recommending that motions for expert funding be conducted ex parte).
78. 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(e); see Lee, supra note 7, at 156-59 (discussing Congress's enactment
of the Criminal Justice Act of 1964); see also Weeks v. Angelone, 4 F. Supp. 2d 497, 526 (E.D. Va.
1998) (concluding that while federal defendants have a right to ex parte applications for expert
funds, it is a statutory right and not a constitutional tight).
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assistance.7 The drafters of the Criminal Justice Act of 1964 were concerned
that open hearings for expert funding would disadvantage indigent defendants
because such hearings would force the premature disclosure of material to the
prosecution."0 Similarly, the A.B.A. Guideines for the Appointment and Peformance
of Defense Counsel in Death Penaty Cases recommend ex parte application for expert
funding to prevent counsel from disclosing privileged information or defense
strategy.8'
Along with the federal government, fourteen of the thirty-eight death
penalty jurisdictions have statutes that provide defendants with at least a partial
right to apply ex parte for expert assistance.8 2 South Carolina's statute is typical:
U pon a finding in ex parte proceedings that investigative, expert, or
oler services are reasonably necessary for the representation of the
defendant whether in connection with issues relating to guilt or
sentence, the court shall authorize the defendant's attorneys to obtain
such services on behalf of the defendant .... Payment of such fees
and expenses may be ordered in cases where the defendant is an
indigent represented by either court-appointed, private counsel or the
public defender.
83
Various non-death penalty jurisdictions also permit ex parte application for
expert funding.' Most of these statutes apply to requests for experts as well as
investigators and other defense services.8 ' Further, seven death penalty juris-
79. See, e.g., Ex Parte Moody, 684 So. 2d 114, 120 (Ala. 1996) (citing the federal standard in
concluding that defendants are entitled to apply ex parte for expert assistance).
80. See generaly Lee, supra note 7, at 156-59 (citing Cimina/Justice Act of 1964: Heanngs on S.
63, 1057Before tbeSenate Comm. On tbeJudiiagy, 88th Cong., at 149,173 (statements ofJudge William
F. Smith and Senator Hruska) [hereinafter Heanngs on S. 631) (discussing Congress's decision to
require ex parte application for expert funding).
81. ABA GUIDELINES, supra note 77, at § 10.4 cmt.
82. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 987.9(a) (West Supp. 2005) (permitting capital defendants to
apply ex parte for funds for expert assistance); DEL. SUPER. CT. CRIM. R.ANN. 44(e)(4) (same); 725
ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 124/15(h), (i)(1) (West Supp. 2004) (same); IND. R. CRIM. P. 24(C)(2)
(same); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-4508 (1995) (same); KEN. REV. STAT. ANN. § 31.185(2) (Michie
Supp. 2004) (same); NEV. REV. STAT. S 7.135 (2003) (same); N.Y. JUD. LAw 35-b(8) (McKinney
2002) (same); N.C. INDIGENT DEF. SvCs. R. 2D.4 (same); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-26(C) (1) (Law.
Co-op. 2003) (same); TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-14-207(b) (2003) (same); TEX. CODE CRIM. P. art.
26.052(0 (Vernon Supp. 2004-05) (same); WASH. SUPERIOR CT. CIuM. R. 3.1(0(2) (same); see also
ARIz. R. CRIM. P. 15.9(b) (permitting capital defendants to apply ex parte for expert funding upon
a showing of need).
83. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-26(C)(1).
84. See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 11-2605(a) (1995) (requiring courts to conduct ex parte
hearings on motions for expert assistance); MINN. STAT. ANN. S 611.21 (a) (West 2003) (same); N.D.
R. CRIM. P. 44(b) (same); W. VA. TRIAL CT. R. 35.04 (permitting a court to conduct an ex parte
hearing for expert funding upon a showing of good cause).
85. See, e.g., CAL, PENAL CODE § 9879.9(a) (providing the right to apply ex parte for
20051
CAPITAL DEFENSE JOURNAL [Vol. 17:2
dictions currently have case law that requires courts to permit some form of ex
parte application for expert funding. 6 A few other courts, while not expressly
requiring ex parte hearings, have indicated that they are preferred. 7
B. Limited Right to an Ex Parte Hearing
Other state courts and statutes permit a defendant to apply ex parte for
expert funding upon a showing of need.8 In State v. Touchet, 9 the Supreme Court
of Louisiana rejected the request that courts be required to permit ex parte
application for expert assistance and instead adopted a rule that permitted the
defendant to file the motion in camera but also required courts to give the
prosecution notice of the hearing and the opportunity to file a brief in
opposition.9" After the judge reviewed the defendant's motion, the judge was to
permit the prosecution to be present at the hearing if the defendant did not
initially show a need to continue the hearing ex parte.9" The defendant
establishes need by "showing that certain essential and potentially meritorious
elements of his defense will be disclosed to the state if there is a contradictory
"payment of investigators, experts, and others for the preparation or presentation of the defense").
86. See Ex Parte Moody, 684 So. 2d at 121 (holding that the capital defendant was entitled
to an ex parte hearing for expert funding); People v. Anderson, 742 P.2d 1306, 1320-22 (Cal. 1987)
(same); Brooks v. State, 385 S.E.2d 81, 84 (Ga. 1989) (same); State v. Ballard, 428 S.E.2d 178, 179
(N.C. 1993) (same); Expare Lexington County, 442 S.E.2d 589, 593 (S.C. 1994) (same); State v.
Barnett, 909 S.W.2d 423,429-30 (Tenn. 1995) (same); Wilhams, 958 S.W.2d at 194 (same).
87. See Dunn v. State, 722 S.W.2d 595, 596 (Ark. 1987) (indicating that the hearing for expert
funding was conducted ex parte); State v. Hamilton, 448 So. 2d 1007, 1008-09 (Fla. 1984) (finding
that the prosecution is not entitled to notice or a hearing for the appointment of a psychiatrist);
Arnold v. Higa, 600 P.2d 1383, 1385 (Haw. 1979) (remanding a decision for an ex parte hearing on
a defendant's need for certain litigation expenses); People v. Loyer, 425 N.W.2d 714, 722 (Mich.
1988) (requiing courts to permit ex parte application for expert witness fees); Manning v. State, 726
So. 2d 1152, 1191 (Miss. 1998) (noting that the prosecution has no role to play in the court's
decision on whether an expert is necessary to the defense); Fitzgerald v. State, 972 P.2d 1157,
1165-66 (Okla. Crim. App. 1998) (indicating that public defenders in counties with their own public
defender system may apply ex parte to courts for expert funds); McGregor v. State, 733 P.2d 416,
416-17 (Okla. Crim. App. 1987) (issuing a writ of mandamus requiring that the trial court conduct
an ex parte hearing for expert funding); State v. Newcomer, 737 P.2d 1285, 1291 (Wash. Ct. App.
1987) (indicating that expert funding hearings are to be conducted ex parte). But see McGilberry v.
State, 741 So. 2d 894, 916-17 (Miss. 1999) (holding that it was not an abuse of discretion for the
trial court to deny the defendant's request for an ex parte hearing).
88. See Stevens v. State, 770 N.E.2d 739,759 (Ind. 2002) (requiring a showing of good cause
for an ex parte hearing); State v. Touchet, 642 So. 2d 1213, 1214 (La. 1994) (requiring a defendant
to show necessity for an ex parte hearing); State v. Peeples, 640 N.E.2d 208, 212 (Ohio Ct. App.
1994) (requiring a showing of necessity).
89. 642 So. 2d 1213 (La. 1994).
90. Toucher, 642 So. 2d at 1214.
91. Id.
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hearing on the request for funds. 92 In Stevens v. State,93 the Supreme Court of
Indiana came to a similar conclusion and permitted defendants to apply ex parte
for expert funding upon a showing of good cause.94
Arizona is the only state legislature to address the ex parte issue and require
capital defendants to show need in order to apply ex parte for expert funding.95
Federal law also requires capital defendants to show a "need for confidentiality"
before they are permitted to apply ex parte for expert funds. 96 In 1996 Congress
amended 21 U.S.C. § 848 to require that defendants show a need for
confidentiality; the former statute granted ex parte hearings without any showing
of need.97 Thus, federal capital defendants must show need in order to receive
an ex parte hearing, while non-capital federal defendants are automatically
entitled to an ex parte hearing.9 8 In practice, however, federal courts routinely
grant ex parte hearings to capital defendants and rarely require a showing of
necessity.99
C No Right to an Ex Parte Hearing
In addition to Virginia, three other state courts have held that trial courts
need not permit defendants to apply ex parte for expert funding1 0 In rejecting
the defendant's request for an ex parte hearing, the Supreme Court of Arizona
in State v. Apelt cited an Arizona judicial canon that prohibited ex parte
proceedings and concluded that ex parte applications were not a basic tool of an
adequate defense for due process purposes. 2 Responding to the defendant's
concern over premature disclosure of defense strategy, the court noted that
Arizona's discovery rules already require extensive disclosure by the defense and
92. Id. at 1220.
93. 770 N.E.2d 739 (Ind. 2002).
94. Stevens, 770 N.E.2d at 759.
95. ARiz. R. CRiM. P. 15.9.
96. 21 U.S.C. § 848()(9) (2000).
97. See 21 U.S.C. § 848(q)(9) (1992) (requiring federal judges to provide funds for expert or
investigative assistance "[u]pon a finding in ex parte proceedings that investigative, expert or other
services are reasonably necessary for the representation of the defendant").
98. See 18 U.S.C. 5 3006A(e) (2000) (providing indigent defendants with the right to apply
ex parte for expert funding).
99. Interview with David Bruck, Director, Virginia Capital Case Clearinghouse (Mar. 2,
2005).
100. See-Apel, 861 P.2d at 649-50 (finding that the defendant had no constitutional right to
an ex parte hearing for expert assistance); State v. Wood, 967 P.2d 702, 713-14 (Idaho 1998)
(same); State v. Floody, 481 N.W.2d 242,254-56 (S.D. 1992) (same); see also State v. Turner, 12 P.3d
934,945-46 (Mont. 2000) (rejecting the defendant's argument that his counsel was ineffective for
failing to request an ex parte hearing for mental health expert funding).
101. 861 P.2d 634 (Ariz. 1993).
102. Apel, 861 P.2d at 650.
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found that prejudice only occurs "when the expert's analysis turns out to support
a position contrary to that of the defendant."'0 3 The Supreme Court of South
Dakota in State v. Floody04 rejected the defendant's contention that the
Constitution required ex parte hearings and implied that the prosecution's
presence was necessary whenever "government expense is involved to 'prevent
abuses often attempted by defendants.' ,,I05 Additionally, the Supreme Court of
Idaho in State v. Wood ' rejected the defendant's contention that Ake's language
concerning ex parte hearings created a constitutional entitlement to ex parte
hearings for expert assistance. 10 7
D. Expert Funding Through Alternative Sources and the
Actual Conduct of State Trial Courts
In some jurisdictions, the issue of ex parte application for expert funding
does not arise because the public defenders and court-appointed attorneys may
apply to the state's public defender agency for expert funds and thus do not need
to ask the courts for funds. In states such as Oregon, Colorado, Missouri,
Louisiana, New Mexico, Oklahoma, Maryland, NewJersey, Connecticut, as well
as most major cities like Philadelphia, the state or city indigent defense system
controls the distribution of expert funds for defendants represented by public
defenders and court-appointed conflict counsel.10 8 Ideally, Virginia's indigent
defense system would control funding for experts because, in addition to
removing the need for an open hearing, that system would avoid involving the
103. Id.
104. 481 N.W.2d 242 (S.D. 1992).
105. Floody, 481 N.W.2d at 256 (quoting Feguer v. United States, 302 F.2d 214, 241 (8th Cir.
1962)).
106. 967 P.2d 702 (Idaho 1998).
107. Wood, 967 P.2d at 713-14.
108. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 51-292 (West 1985) (providing that the indigent defense
commission shall review applicants' requests for expert funding); MD. ANN. CODE art. 27A, § 5(2)
(2003) (requiring the Public Defender to prepare a fee schedule for technical services provided to
indigent persons); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:158A-5 (West Supp. 2004) (requiring the Public Defender
to provide necessary services to defendants in every case); OKLA. STAT. tit. 22 § 1355.4(D) (West
2003) (noting that attorneys appointed by the Indigent Defense System shall apply to the Indigent
Defense System for expert services); OR. REV. STAT. § 135.055(3)(a) (2003) (requiring that motions
for expert funding be made directly to the Public Defense Services Commission); THE
SPANGENBERG GROUP, RATES OF COMPENSATION FOR COURT-APPoINTED COUNSEL IN CAPrrAL
CASES AT TRIAL: A STATE BY STATE OVERVIEW, 2003, at 12,14, http://www.abanet.org/
legalservices/downloads/sclad/indigentdefense/compensationratescapital2003.pdf [hereinafter
COMPENSATION FOR COURT-APPOINTED COUNSEL] (explaining that Louisiana and New Mexico
require court-appointed counsel to request expert funding from the state public defender commis-
sion); E-mail from Kathleen Lord, Attorney at Law, Denver, Colo., to author (Feb. 3,2005, 18:55
EST) (on file with author) [hereinafter Lord] (explaining Colorado's procedures); E-mail from Bill
Odle, Attorney at Law, Kansas City, Mo., to author (Feb. 7,2005,11:59 ES') (explaining Missouri's
procedures) (on file with author).
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trial judge in evaluating and even potentially controlling the defense's trial
strategy. As an alternative approach, California requires that a judge other than
the trial judge hear the motion for expert assistance; Utah has a similar provision
that is triggered upon the defendant's request."0 9 Either system prevents the trial
judge who will actually hear the defendant's case from scrutinizing and making
important decisions about the conduct of the defense prior to trial.
Regardless of statutory or case law, most trial courts outside of Virginia
permit defendants to apply ex parte for expert funds. Despite the Supreme
Court of Arizona's holding inApelt, Arizona defense attorneys report that many
Arizona trial judges routinely permit ex parte application for expert funding."'
The same is true of South Dakota where, despite the court's holding in Floody,
some trial courts permit ex parte applications in that state's limited number of
capital cases."' In other states with no statutory or case law on the issue, trial
judges routinely grant ex parte hearings for expert assistance." 2 For instance, in
Mississippi, capital cases handled by the publicly-funded Capital Defense
Counsel receive expert funds from their own office, while other court-appointed
attorneys apply ex parte to the court for expert funds."3 Florida provides
funding to circuit public defender organizations to use for their own clients at
their discretion." 4 While Florida's court-appointed attorneys normally request
expert funds from their circuit's indigent services committee, court-appointed
attorneys who apply to courts for funding generally do so ex parte."' Before
109. CAL. PENAL CODE § 987.9(a) (West Supp. 2005); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-32-305.5(3)
(2003).
110. E-mail from Conrad Baran, Attorney at Law, Phoenix, Ariz., to author (Jan. 25, 2005,
18:56:51 EST) (on file with author); E-mail from Bret Huggins, Attorney at Law, Florence, Ariz.,
to author (Jan. 26, 2005, 12:03 EST) (on file with author).
111. E-mail from Leslie Bowman, Attorney at Law, Belle Fourche, S.D., to author (Jan. 25,
2005, 19:25 EST) (on file with author); see E-mail from David Hosmer, Attorney at Law, Yankton,
S.D., to author (Jan. 20,2005, 10:55 EST) (on file with author) (explaining that some judges allow
informal ex parte communication on the need for expert funding, even if the judge conducts the
formal hearing with the prosecution present).
112. See E-mail from Ray Carter, Attorney at Law, Jackson, Miss., to author (Feb. 4, 2005,
04:24 PM EST) (on file with author) [hereinafter Carter] (explaining Mississippi's procedures); E-
mail from Marc Bookrnan, Attorney at Law, Phila., Pa., to author (Feb. 5,2005,23:07 EST) (on file
with author) (explaining Pennsylvania's procedures).
113. Carter, supra note 112.
114. FLA. STAT. ch. 29.006(3) (West 2003).
115. Interview with Peter Mills, Attorney at Law, Bartow, Fla. (Feb. 28, 2005). Florida's court-
appointed attorneys apply to their circuit's indigent services committee for expert funds. Id. Some
circuit's indigent service committees, however, run more effectively than others and court-ap-
pointed attorneys in the less effectively run circuits often apply to courts for expert funds instead
of applying to the indigent services committee. Id.
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Colorado's public defender system received authority to disburse expert funds,
trial judges routinely permitted ex parte applications.
16
In a few other states, however, the prevailing practice is less clear and
whether a defendant is permitted to apply ex parte for funding may depend on
the trial judge." 7 Utah is such a jurisdiction." 8 Capital defense attorneys in
Utah, however, may incur up to $7,500 for an investigator and mitigation expert
before they must ask the courts for expert funding, and thus the issue of open
hearings for funding does not arise as frequently as it does in Virginia." 9
Further, the public defender offices in Utah's three major cities, Salt Lake City,
Provo, and Ogden, retain control over funding in capital cases within their
offices, and thus, these public defender attorneys need not apply to courts for
expert funds. 2 ° In Nebraska, judges typically deny requests to apply ex parte for
expert funds. 2 ' However, the issue also does not arise as frequently in Nebraska
because county public defender organizations often retain discretion over expert
funds."2 In sum, in the overwhelming majority of death penalty jurisdictions,
most requests for expert funding are made ex parte, and Virginia stands almost
alone in refusing to permit such ex parte hearings.
V. ConstitutionalArguments for Providing an Ex Parte Hearing
A. Due Process
An open hearing for expert funding burdens a defendant's due process right
to a fair trial under the Fourteenth Amendment. Various state courts have
concluded that the Due Process Clause requires courts to permit defendants to
apply ex parte for expert funding.'23 Yet the framework that courts should use
to analyze due process challenges to rules of criminal procedure is unclear. None
of the state supreme court opinions addressing the issue of open hearings for
expert assistance or United States Supreme Court opinions addressing due
116. Lord, supra note 108.
117. E-mail from Richard Mauro, Attorney at Law, Salt Lake City, Utah, to author (Feb. 7,




121. E-mail fromJeffPickens, Attorney at Law, Lincoln, Neb., to author (Feb. 7,2005, 10:53
ES) (on file with author) (explaining Nebraska's procedures).
122. Id.
123. See Moody, 684 So. 2d at 120 (implying that due process requires ex parte application for
expert assistance because it is a basic tool of an adequate defense); Brooks, 385 S.E.2d at 84 (using
the Mathews test to determine whether applications for expert funding must be made ex parte);
Wi/hams, 958 S.W.2d at 192 ("While the Supreme Court's suggestion [in Ake] that the threshold




process challenges to rules of criminal procedure have applied a consistent due
process analysis. 4 Although the Court inAke used the Mathews test, subsequent
Supreme Court cases have cast doubt on whether Ake appropriately injected
Mathews into the setting of criminal procedure." 5 More recently, in assessing
whether a state statute that required the defendant to prove incompetence to
stand trial violated the defendant's due process rights, the Court in Medina v.
Cakfornia26 rejected Ake's importation of the Mathews test into criminal
procedure and, instead, adopted a due process analysis first used in Patterson v.
New York.'27 Accordingly, this article will analyze whether an open hearing for
expert funds violates a defendant's due process rights under Medina's framework.
The Court in Medina first noted that a state rule of criminal procedure
violates a defendant's due process rights only "if 'it offends some principle of
justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked
as fundamental.' ,,"2 This standard derives from a long line of due process cases
concerning rules of criminal procedure starting with Justice Cardozo's opinions
in Snyder v. Massachusetts29 and Palko v. Connecticut3 ° and continuing through
Patterson. 3 In order to make such a determination, the Medina Court examined
124. Compare Brooks, 385 S.E.2d at 84 (using Mathews to analyze a due process challenge to
open hearings for expert funding), with Wiliams, 958 S.W.2d at 193 (finding that open hearings for
expert assistance are contrary to Ake's promise of "meaningful access to justice").
125. Ake, 470 U.S. at 77 (citing Britt v. North Carolina, 404 U.S. 226,227 (1971)); see Mathews,
424 U.S. at 335 (assessing whether an administrative proceeding met the requirements of the Due
Process Clause). The Court has used the Mathews test one other time in assessing a due process
challenge to a rule of criminal procedure. See United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 677 (1980)
(citing Mathews in rejecting a due process challenge to a federal statute permitting magistrates to
make findings on motions to suppress evidence); see also David A. Harris, Ake Revisited: Expert
Psychiatric Witnesses Remain Bqyond Reach for the Indgent, 68 N.C. L. REV. 763, 766 n.27 (1990) (com-
menting that some scholars have considered the Mathews test inappropriate because it is so capable
of being manipulated); John M. West, Note, Expert Services and the Indigent Criminal Defendant: the
Constitutional Mandate ofAke v. Oklahoma, 84 MICH. L. REv. 1326, 1332 n.41 (1986) (noting that
prior to Ake the United States Supreme Court had rarely used the Mathews test in the context of
criminal procedure and that the manipulability of the factors makes the test dangerous to apply).
126. 505 U.S. 437 (1992).
127. Medina v. California, 505 U.S. 437, 443-45 (1992); see Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S.
197, 202-05 (1977) (evaluating the historical practice, the operation of the challenged rule, and the
Court's own precedent in rejecting a due process challenge to a statute that required defendants to
prove extreme emotional disturbance); Carlton Bailey, Ake v. Oklahoma and an Indigent Defendant's
' 'ght'to an Expert Witness: A Promise Denied or Imagine?, 10 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 401,409 n.84
(2002) (noting that Ake has been justified by the Medina line of cases, which offer an alternate
approach to due process thanAke and asserting that theMedinadue process approach is preferable).
128. Medina, 505 U.S. at 445 (quoting Patterson, 432 U.S. at 202).
129. 291 U.S. 97 (1934).
130. 302 U.S. 319 (1937).
131. See Patterson, 432 U.S. at 201-02 (citing the "traditions and conscience of our people"
language in determining whether a statute violated a defendant's due process rights when it required
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historical practice, the operation of the challenged rule, and the Court's own
precedent.'32 The Court, however, noted that federal courts should remain very
deferential to state rules of criminal procedure."3 The Court then rejected the
defendant's due process claim because there was no settled historical or
contemporary practice on who shoulders the burden of proving competence to
stand trial and the statute adequately protected the defendant's right not to stand
trial if incompetent. 3" Four years after Medina, the Court in Cooperv. Oklahoma
135
sustained a due process challenge to a rule that required defendants to prove
incompetence to stand trial by clear and convincing evidence. 36 The Court
analyzed the claim under Medinds framework and determined that historical and
contemporary practice and the operation of the rule weighed against requiring
that defendants prove incompetence to stand trial by clear and convincing
evidence.
37
There is little historical practice regarding application for expert funding
because Ake granted the constitutional right less than twenty years ago.
13
Although most states provided indigent defendants with some sort of expert
funding prior to Ake, only five states and the federal government had statutory
or case law that required courts to conduct ex parte hearings. 39 The Court in
Medina and Cooper also examined contemporary state and federal practice."
Cooper's holding rested in large part on the fact that only four of fifty states used
the procedure in question, while the rest of the states used a procedure more
favorable to the defendant."' Refusal to permit ex parte hearings for expert
the defense to prove extreme emotional disturbance); Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325, 328
(1937) (citing the "traditions and conscience of our people" language in determining that the
Fourteenth Amendment did not incorporate the Fifth Amendment's prohibition against double
jeopardy); Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 104-05 (1934) (stating that the trial court's denial
of the defendant's request to be present when the jury viewed the crime scene did not violate his
Fourteenth Amendment due process rights because it did not "offend[ some principle of justice
so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental").
132. Medina, 505 U.S. at 446-53; see Cooper v. Oklahoma, 517 U.S. 348,355-67 (1996) (using
the test from Medina to assess a due process challenge to a statute that required the defendant to
prove incompetence to stand trial by clear and convincing evidence).
133. Medina, 505 U.S. at 443-44.
134. Id. at 446-51.
135. 517 U.S. 348 (1996).
136. Cooper, 517 U.S. at 355-56, 362.
137. Id. at 362, 367.
138. See Ake, 470 U.S. at 83-84 (providing a constitutional right to a psychiatrist when the
defendant's sanity at the time of the offense is at issue).
139. See 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(e) (2000) (permitting defendants to apply ex parte for expert
funding); Lee, supra note 7, at 155-59 (discussing the historical use of ex parte proceedings for
expert funding prior to Ake).
140. Medina, 505 U.S. at 447-48; Cooper, 517 U.S. at 360-62.
141. Cooper, 517 U.S. at 360-62.
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fundingis likewise a rarity among American jurisdictions.'42 Currently, seventeen
of the thirty-eight death penalty jurisdictions have statutory or case law that gives
defendants at least a partial right to apply ex parte for expert funds.'4 3 Of the
states with no statutory or case law on the subject, nine states distribute expert
funds through the state public defender organization, and counsel therefore need
not apply to courts for expert funds.'" Further, in five other death penalty
jurisdictions, at least half of the trial judges routinely permit ex parte application
for expert funds.'45 In total, in only three or four states do trial judges routinely
deny requests for ex parte application.'" Thus, contemporary practice weighs
against open hearings for expert funding.
The Court in Cooper and Medina also examined Supreme Court precedent in
its due process analysis.'47 Although the Court has never directly addressed the
issue of open hearings for expert funds, the Court in Wardius v. Oregon.4 8
addressed a similar issue.'49 In Wardius, the Court balanced the state and private
interests involved to find that an Oregon notice of alibi statute violated a
defendant's due process rights because it did not require the prosecution to
provide reciprocal discovery once the defendant disclosed his potential alibi
witnesses.' The Court noted that "[i]t is fundamentally unfair to require a
defendant to divulge the details of his own case while at the same time subjecting
him to the hazard of surprise concerning refutation of the very pieces of
evidence which he disclosed to the State."' 5 ' The State in WIardius had conceded
that it had no interest in withholding reciprocal discovery.'
52
Open hearings for expert funds pose a similar dilemma. Unless they forgo
requesting an expert, defendants are required to disclose material to the State
with no reciprocal benefit, and the prosecution gains a substantial tactical
142. See supra notes 77-122 and accompanying text (surveying state procedures concerning
ex parte hearings).
143. See supra notes 82-107 and accompanying text (surveying statutory and case law concern-
ing ex parte hearings).
144. See supra note 108 and accompanying text (listing the states that distribute expert funds
through a public defender commission).
145. See supra notes 110-116 and accompanying text (describing the jurisdictions in which trial
judges routinely grant ex parte hearings).
146. See supra notes 77-122 and accompanying text (surveying state practices regarding ex
parte hearings).
147. Medina, 505 U.S. at 446; Cooper, 517 U.S. at 362-68.
148. 412 U.S. 470 (1973).
149. Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470, 471-72 (1973).
150. Id.




advantage over the defendant."3 Although the disclosure by the defendant is not
formally compelled as it was in Wardius, open hearings still contain an element
of compulsion because the defendants risk not receiving necessary assistance if
they do not disclose their need for assistance with sufficient particularity.1
5 4
Additionally, the Court in Medina and Cooper analyzed the operation of the
challenged rule and assessed the risks inherent in the procedures at issue.1'5 In
rejecting the defendant's due process claim, Medina emphasized that the burden
of proof would only affect the outcome of a limited number of cases and that
the defendant's attorney was in a better position to assess competency because
the attorney had closer contact with the defendant.1 6 Conversely, the Court in
Coopercame to the opposite conclusion because requiring proof of incompetence
by clear and convincing evidence created a risk of an erroneous determination
of competence that could be fatal for the defendant but only minor to the
State.1' Further, the Court in Cooper was concerned that an erroneous
determination of competence would inhibit the defendant's ability to assert other
constitutional rights." 8 The Court in Cooper distinguished Medina by noting that
a larger group of defendants would be affected by the clear and convincing
evidence burden.'
5 9
This facet of the Medina analysis weighs heavily in favor of a right to ex
parte proceedings."6 Open hearings pose substantial risks to indigent defen-
dants.'"' As in Cooper, open hearings affect almost every capital defendant
because of the widespread use of expert assistance in capital cases. The
possibility that the defense will not request an expert in order to protect the
confidentiality of defense information risks burdening a defendant's rights to
compulsory process, to effective assistance of counsel, against self-incrimination,
and to expert assistance at trial. 6 2 When defendants apply for expert funds and
disclose their strategy to the prosecution, they give the prosecution a substantial
tactical advantage by providing it with information it can use to tailor its pretrial
153. See supra notes 41-62 and accompanying text (explaining the disadvantages to open
hearings for expert funds).
154. See Wlardius, 412 U.S. at 471-72 (noting that Oregon's notice of alibi statute precluded
defendants from introducing an alibi witness if they did not disclose it prior to trial).
155. Medina, 505 U.S. at 448; Cooper, 517 U.S. at 362-67.
156. Medina, 505 U.S. at 449, 450.
157. Cooper, 517 U.S. at 364-67.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 364.
160. Medina, 505 U.S. at 448 (examining the operation of the challenged rule in its due process
analysis).
161. See spra notes 41-62 and accompanying text (examining the effects of open hearings for
expert funding on the defense).
162. See infra notes 185-256 and accompanying text (explaining the Fifth and Sixth Amend-
ment implications of open hearings for expert funds).
[Vol. 17:2
EX PARTE HEARING
investigation, opening and closing statements, presentation of witnesses and
evidence, and cross-examination.
16 3
Conversely, ex parte applications pose little risk to the State. A recurring
argument against ex parte applications for expert funding is that the State should
have some input on the expenditure of state resources. 164 In this context,
however, trial courts themselves provide adequate safeguards against needless
expenditure of state funds.165 Attorneys routinely note that judges scrutinize
requests for funds closely and are concerned with the potential wasting of state
funds. 66 Also, administratively, ex parte applications would not add any cost in
terms of the attorneys' or state's time and, if anything, would be cheaper because
they would eliminate an issue for which the State would need to take time to
prepare. 167 Thus, the State's interest in preserving state funds would not be
jeopardized by ex parte application for expert funds.
To be sure, there is a state interest in avoiding undue ex parte comm-
unication with the court and providing adversarial hearings when possible.
68
Various state courts have cited judicial canons against ex parte hearings in
rejecting defendants' contentions that they have a right to ex parte appli-
cations. 16 9 For instance, Virginia's code of judicial conduct prohibits judges from
considering ex parte communications unless they would not prejudice any party
involved. 7 ° Yet, other courts with similar judicial canons have held that
defendants have at least a limited right to an ex parte hearing.171 Further, the
163. See Toucher, 642 So. 2d at 1218 (discussing the tactical advantage that open hearings for
expert assistance give to the prosecution).
164. See, e.g., Floody, 481 N.W.2d at 256 (citing the State's interest in preventing the abuse of
state funds).
165. See Moody, 684 So. 2d at 121 (noting that an ex parte hearing "can adequately protect
taxpayers from unwise expenditures of money while at the same time protecting the constitutional
rights of indigent defendants').
166. See VIRGINIA INDIGENT DEFENSE REPORT, supra note 3, at 64 (citing a comment by a
public defender in Richmond that judges often act like the funds are coming out of their own
wallets); Shapiro, supra note 5 (discussing capital trials in which the judge has refused to appoint an
expert for the defense).
167. See Thomas Bassett, The Necessity of Ex Parte Proceedings for Indigent Criminal Defendants, 55
J. MissouRi B. 32, 33 (1999) (noting that ex parte hearings would add no additional costs).
168. See Toucher, 642 So. 2d at 1217 (noting that due process weighs in favor of using ad-
versarial hearings when possible).
169. See, e.g., Apel, 861 P.2d at 650 (noting that ex parte hearings "would violate Canon
3(A)(4) of the Code of judicial Conduct, which forbids exparte proceedings except where autho-
rized by law").
170. VA. CANONS OFJUD. CONDUCT 3(B)(7).
171. See Stevens, 770 N.E.2d at 758-59 (explaining that although Indiana's rules of judicial
conduct counsel against ex parte communications, the defendant had a limited right to an ex parte
hearing); Toucher, 642 So. 2d at 1220 (giving defendants a limited right to an ex parte hearing despite
a judicial canon advising otherwise).
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interest in adversarial hearings is minimal in this context because the State will
likely not know enough about the defense's strategy to be in a position to argue
why a given expert is not necessary for an adequate defense.'
7 2
The risks to the defendant in conducting an open hearing for expert
funding substantially outweigh the risks to the State when defendants apply ex
parte for funds. As long ago as the Senate Judiciary Committee hearing on the
Criminal Justice Act of 1964,Judge William F. Smith of the Third Circuit Court
of Appeals and Senator Roman Hruska noted that forcing the defense
prematurely to disclose its theories and strategies was too high a price to obtain
expert assistance.'73 The Supreme Court's decision in Wardius echoes the same
concern-that it is fundamentally unfair to force the defense to give the
prosecution discovery information without any reciprocal disclosure.'74
Additionally, only a few states do not routinely allow ex parte applications for
expert funds.'75 Thus, the current weight of authority and practice among states
and the federal government, Supreme Court precedent, and the risks to the
defendant all lead to the conclusion that it is fundamentally unfair to permit the
prosecution to be present at a hearing for expert funding.
B. Equal Protection
The United States Supreme Court has made it extremely difficult for
indigent criminal defendants to use the Equal Protection Clause to invalidate a
state rule of criminal procedure.'76 The Court has made it clear that wealth is not
a suspect classification triggering strict scrutiny; rather, wealth-based
classifications must only rationally relate to a state interest in order to pass
constitutional muster.'7 7 The Court in Ross signaled that theDue Process Clause
was the proper framework for analyzing disparities between rich and poor
criminal defendants, stating that "[t]he duty of the State... is not to duplicate
the legal arsenal that may be privately retained by a criminal defendant.., but
only to assure the indigent defendant an adequate opportunity to present his
claims fairly."'7 8 Yet the Equal Protection Clause still lingers in opinions like
172. Toucher, 642 So. 2d at 1220.
173. Lee, supra note 7, at 157-58 (citingHearings on S. 63, supranote 80, at 149,173 (statements
of judge William F. Smith and Senator Hruska)).
174. Wardius, 412 U.S. at 475-76.
175. See supra notes 77-122 and accompanying text (surveying state practice concerning ex
parte hearings).
176. See Harris, supra note 125, at 766 n.24 (noting that the Court's holding in Ross "limits the
reach of equal protection for indigent criminal defendants to no more than due process affords").
177. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 29 (1973).
178. Ross, 417 U.S. at 616; see also Ake, 470 U.S. at 76--77 (citing cases such as Griffin, which
are based on the Equal Protection Clause, but basing its holding on the Due Process Clause); Note,
Indigent CriminalDefendant's Right to a Pychiatrist, 99 HARV. L. REV. 130, 139 (1985) [hereinafter Right
to a PRychiatis4] (noting that Ross "render[ed] the standard of equal protection virtually indistinguish-
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Ake, in which Justice Marshall sought to ensure that indigent defendants
received "meaningful access to justice" and cited such opinions as Gnffin v.
Illinois'79 and Douglas v. Calfornias° that were based on the Equal Protection
Clause.'
Many state and federal court opinions also echo equal protection concerns,
but then conflate due process with equal protection analysis without specifically
finding an Equal Protection Clause violation. 8 ' Congress was also concerned
with the equal protection implications of open hearings when it drafted the
Criminal Justice Act of 1964.183 Thus, although an explicit equal protection
argument will be difficult to make, it is worthwhile to address the equal
protection concerns by including them within a due process argument.
l 4
C Fifth Amendment
The Fifth Amendment guarantees that "[n]o person shall... be compelled
in any criminal case to be a witness against himself.' 185 Several state courts have
noted that the prosecution's presence at a hearing for expert assistance may
able from the standard of due process in cases concerning the rights of indigent criminal defen-
dants').
179. 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
180. 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
181. SeeAke, 470 U.S. at 76 ("[]ustice cannot be equal where, simply as a result of his poverty,
a defendant is denied the opportunity to participate meaningfully in a judicial proceeding in which
his liberty is at stake."); Douglas, 372 U.S. at 357-58 (holding that the Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses require the state to provide an indigent defendant with counsel for the defen-
dant's first appeal); Griffin, 351 U.S. at 18-19 (holding that the Due Process and Equal Protection
Clauses require the state to provide at no cost trial transcripts to indigent defendants); Harris, supra
note 125, at 780-81 (noting that although Ake's holding was based on due process, it had strong
equal protection language); Rightto aPychialrist, supra note 178, at 139-40 (noting thatAke collapsed
equal protection analysis into due process analysis for issues involving services for indigent
defendants).
182. See United States v. Meriwether, 486 F.2d 498, 506 (5th Cir. 1973) ("When an indigent
defendant's case is subjected to pre-trial scrutiny by the prosecutor, while the monied defendant is
able to proceed without such scrutiny, serious equal protection questions are raised.'); Moody, 684
So. 2d at 120 ("An indigent defendant should not have to disclose to the state information that a
financially secure defendant would not have to disclose.'); Brooks, 385 S.E.2d at 83 (noting possible
equal protection concerns resulting from open court hearings); Wil'ams, 958 S.W.2d at 193
(concluding that failure to provide an ex parte hearing prevents defendants from receiving
"meaningful access to justice').
183. Lee, supra note 7, at 157 (citing Hearings on S. 63, supra note 80, at 149).
184. SeeAke, 470 U.S. at 76-77 (referencing equal protection concepts within a due process
analysis); Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 665-67 (1983) (noting the similarity between due
process and equal protection analysis when a court must determine whether the state's treatment
of a criminal defendant was fundamentally unfair or arbitrary).
185. U.S. CONST. amend. V; see Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 11 (1964) (applying the Fifth
Amendment self-incrimination provision to the states).
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infringe on a defendant's privilege against self-incrimination.'86 Communications
that violate the defendant's Fifth Amendment privilege must be self-
incriminating, testimonial, and compelled.'87 Requiring defendants to seek expert
funding at open hearings potentially meets all three of these requirements and
thereby violates defendants' privilege against self-incrimination.
The Self-Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment "protects an
accused only from... provid[ing] the State with evidence of a testimonial or
communicative nature."'8 8 Testimonial communications are communications
that "explicitly or implicitly, relate a factual assertion or disclose information."'' 9
In order to obtain funds for expert assistance in Virginia, defendants must
establish that the expert sought would materially assist their defense and that the
expert's absence would be prejudicial. 90 For instance, defendants planning to
hire a forensics expert must disclose what evidence will be tested, how those
tests will be conducted, and how they relate to their theories about the case.'
Thus, this type of explanation "relate[s] a factual assertion or disclose[s]
information," and qualifies as "testimonial" because when defendants explain
why an expert is necessary to their case they must disclose facts to support their
argument.
9 2
Further, to qualify for Fifth Amendment protection, a communication must
be self-incriminating.'93 Communications during ex parte hearings that disclose
186. See Moody, 684 So. 2d at 120 (determining that open hearings for expert funding encroach
on a defendant's privilege against self-incrimination); Brooks, 385 S.E.2d at 83-84 (noting that failure
to provide an ex parte hearing forces the defendant to reveal potential defenses and possibly raises
self-incrimination concerns); Touchet, 642 So. 2d at 1218 (noting that open hearings raise concerns
under the "Fifth Amendment-based principle that the defendant has a right to compel the State to
investigate its own case, find its own witnesses, prove its own facts, and convince the jury through
its own resources"); Barnett, 909 S.W.2d at 429 (explaining that only in a non-adversarial atmosphere
can the defendant be freed from any self-incrimination concerns in applying for expert assistance).
187. See Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 84 (1970) (concluding that Florida's notice of alibi
rule did not violate the defendant's privilege against self-incrimination because although the
communications were testimonial and self-incriminating, they were not compelled); Robert P.
Mosteller, Discovegy Against the Defense: Tilting the Adversarial Balance, 74 CAL. L. REV. 1569, 1586
(1986) (noting that a Fifth Amendment violation occurs when a defendant's communications are
testimonial, self-incriminating, and physically or morally compelled).
188. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 761 (1966).
189. Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201,210 (1988). The Fifth Amendment does not protect
"against compulsion to submit to fingerprinting, photographing, or measurements, to write or speak
for identification, to appear in court, to stand, to assume a stance, to walk, or to make a particular
gesture." Scbmerber, 384 U.S. at 764.
190. Husske, 476 S.E.2d at 925 (citingAke, 470 U.S. at 82-83).
191. Bright, supra note 46, at 32.
192. Doe, 487 U.S. at 210; see Lee, supra note 7, at 176 (arguing that explanations of why
funding is necessary qualify as a testimonial communication).
193. See Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582,589 (1990) (noting that a statement must be self-
incriminating in order to qualify for Fifth Amendment protection).
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potential justification defenses, such as self-defense or insanity, are self-
incriminating because they concede that the defendant performed the act.
19 4
Further, statements that "furnish a link in the chain of evidence needed to
prosecute the claimant" also qualify as self-incriminating. 95 The court in Ex
Parte Moody96 determined that open hearings implicate the Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination by requiring a defendant to disclose
information, which could " 'furnish a link in the chain of evidence that could
lead to prosecution, as well as evidence that an individual reasonably believes
could be used against him in a criminal prosecution.' 97 When the prosecution
is present at a hearing for expert funding, it may learn of potential defense
strategies and theories about the case. 9 ' These disclosures are links "in the chain
of evidence needed to prosecute the claimant" because they could alert the
prosecution to evidence of which it was previously unaware or allow it to focus
its investigation toward rebutting specific theories that the defense discloses at
the hearing. 99
Finally, a defendant's testimony must be compelled in order to qualify for
the self-incrimination privilege.2' The prototypical case of compulsion occurs
when defendants must choose between talking or serving time in prison.20 1 An
open hearing is not such a situation. However, certain forms of indirect
194. Lee, supra note 7, at 177; see Bassett, supra note 167, at 34 (noting that the disclosure of
a justification defense is self-incriminating).
195. Hoffmanv. United States, 341 U.S. 479,486 (1951); see Mosteller, supra note 187, at 1588
(noting that pretrial discovery disclosed by the defendant may be incriminating because it provides
the prosecution with information before it completes investigation). Professor Mosteller suggests
that pretrial disclosure may be impermissible for various reasons: (1) the information disclosed may
be used to obtain further information against the defendant; (2) the information may provide
collaterally damaging information; (3) the State may use the information to ascertain impeachment
evidence that it otherwise would have pursued; (4) the information could be used to impeach the
defendant's testimony; and (5) the prosecution could use the information to focus their case. Id.
at 1588-89.
196. 684 So. 2d 114 (Ala. 1996).
197. Moody, 684 So. 2d at 120 (quoting Maness v. Meyers, 419 U.S. 449, 461 (1975)).
198. See Karla C. McGrath, Sommers v. Commonwealth:An Indhgent CriminalDefendant's Right
to Public# Funded Expert Assistance Other than the Assistance of Counsel, 84 KY. L.J. 387, 402 (1995)
(noting that the Kentucky Department of Public Advocacy's primary complaint about open
hearings for expert assistance is that they force defendants to reveal defense theory and strategy
before a monied defendant would need to do so).
199. See Bassett, supra note 167, at 34 (noting that testimony in a hearing for expert funding
is self-incriminating because it may alert the prosecution to incriminating or inculpatory evidence
about the defendant).
200. See Wili'ams, 399 U.S. at 83-84 (requiring that testimony be compelled in addition to self-
incriminating and testimonial to qualify for Fifth Amendment protection).
201. See Doe, 487 U.S. at 206 (determining that a court order to produce foreign bank records
qualifies as compelled testimony).
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compulsion may also satisfy the compulsion requirement. °2 One form of
indirect compulsion occurs when the defendant must give up one constitutional
right in order to enforce another.0 3 In Simmons v. United States,2 the United
States Supreme Court concluded that the state may not force defendants to give
up their self-incrimination privilege in order to assert their Fourth Amendment
privilege to exclude evidence illegally seized because the practice would
compromise defendants' Fourth Amendment rights.0 ' The Court in Simmons
held that the State may not use testimony against the defendant that he made to
establish standing to assert his Fourth Amendment right to exclude evidence
obtained by an unreasonable search and seizure.2" Similarly, open hearings for
expert assistance force defendants to choose between their Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination and their constitutional right to expert
assistance under Ake and Husske.2 °7 Just as the Court in Simmons was concerned
about the potential chill that the rule at issue would place on defendants'
willingness to assert their Fourth Amendment rights, there is a danger that open
hearings for expert funding may inhibit defendants' willingness to ask courts for
expert assistance.2 '
Alternatively, to assess whether testimony is indirectly compelled, courts
have balanced the defendant's Fifth Amendment interests against the value of
the challenged practice. 2 9 The United States Supreme Court used this test in
Brooks v. Tennessee2' to determine that a statute requiring a defendant to testify
prior to any other defense witness violated the defendant's Fifth Amendment
202. See Lee, supra note 7, at 178-79 (explaining that courts have found indirect compulsion
when the defendant must give up one constitutional right to assert another or when the defendant's
Fifth Amendment interests outweigh the necessity of the state practice).
203. See Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 394 (1968) (stating that it is "intolerable that
one constitutional right should have to be surrendered in order to assert another").
204. 390 U.S. 377 (1968).
205. Simmons, 390 U.S. at 394; see also United States v. Branker, 418 F.2d 378, 380 (2d Cur.
1969) (determining that a defendant's Fifth Amendment rights were compromised when the State
introduced incriminating testimony that the defendant made during a hearing to proceed in forma
pauperis).
206. Simmons, 390 U.S. at 389-90.
207. SeeAke, 470 U.S. at 83-84 (holding that under certain circumstances due process requires
the court to provide the defendant with funds for expert psychiatric assistance); Husske, 476 S.E.2d
at 925 (holding that under certain circumstances indigent defendants are entitled to funding for a
non-psychiatric expert); Lee, supra note 7, at 177-78 (arguing that permitting the prosecution to
introduce defendants' statements at a hearing for expert funding may constitute compulsion for
Fifth Amendment purposes).
208. See Simmons, 390 U.S. at 394 (noting that the State's use of defendants' testimony from
suppression hearings would chill defendants' willingness to assert their Fourth Amendment rights).
209. Lee, supra note 7, at 178; see Mosteller, supra note 187, at 1599 (explaining that courts have
found compulsion by assessing the substance of the state's interest and the degree of Fifth Amend-
ment values that are implicated).
210. 406 U.S. 605 (1972).
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self-incrimination privilege.21' The Brooks Court arrived at this conclusion
because the defendant's constitutional interests outweighed the State's interest
in preventing the defendant from coloring his testimony after hearing other
212witnesses. An open hearing forces the defendant to give the prosecution pre-
discovery access to defense theories and strategies that may "furnish a link in the
chain of evidence needed to prosecute the claimant for a federal crime."
213
Conversely, the prosecution has no grounds upon which to argue that a par-
ticular expert would be unnecessary to the defense because the State will know
very little about the defense's strategy at that stage of the proceedings.2 1 ' The
State's only possible contribution to the hearing would be to urge the court not
to abuse state funds; however, trial judges routinely consider the state's fiscal
interests in their decisions. 215 Thus, in the context of hearings for expert
funding, the defendant's Fifth Amendment interest in remaining silent outweighs
the State's interest in being present at the hearing. Consequently, an open
hearing for expert funding compels a defendant to disclose self-incriminating
testimony and violates the defendant's Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination.
D. Sixth Amendment
1. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
An open hearing for expert funding also burdens a defendant's Sixth
Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel and "to be confronted with
the witnesses against him." ' 6 A defendant's right to effective assistance of
counsel is not only violated when the attorney is ineffective but also when the
government "interferes in certain ways with the ability of counsel to make
211. Brooks v. Tennessee, 406 U.S. 605, 612 (1972).
212. Id. at 610-12; see also Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 236-38 (1980) (balancing the
defendant's Fifth Amendment interests against the value of the existing procedures to assess
whether the State could use the defendant's prearrest silence to impeach him).
213. Hoffman, 341 U.S. at 486; see Mosteller, supra note 187, at 1588 (proposing that pretrial
disclosures by defendants may violate their Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination
because they allow the prosecution to focus their investigation on the defendant's strategies).
214. See Paul C. Giannelli, Ake v. Oklahoma: The Right to Expert Assistance in a Post-Daubert,
Post-DNA World, 89 CORNELL L. REv. 1305, 1403-04 (2004) (arguing that a hearing for expert
funding is not an adversarial hearing and that the State has little to contribute at such a hearing).
215. See Moody, 684 So. 2d at 121 (noting that the trial court can protect state coffers suffi-
ciently in the prosecution's absence); Gianneli, supra note 214, at 1403-04 (arguing that the
prosecution's duty is not to protect state coffers).
216. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the




independent decisions about how to conduct the defense. '117 For example, the
Court in United States v. Cronic"' examined whether the trial court violated the
defendant's right to effective assistance of counsel when it appointed an
inexperienced real estate attorney to defend a complex mail fraud case and only
gave the attorney twenty-five days to prepare for trial.21 9 The issue was not the
attorney's own poor performance but whether the government placed the
attorney in such a situation that "the likelihood that any lawyer, even a fully
competent one, could provide effective assistance is so small that a presumption
of prejudice is appropriate without inquiry into the actual conduct of the trial."'
The Court's focus was whether the trial court's actions caused a breakdown in
the adversarial process. 21
The statute in Brooks, which forced the defendant to testify before any other
defense witness or not at all, may have qualified as a situation in which the trial
court's actions led to a complete breakdown in the adversarial process.'m
Although Brooks predated Cronic and did not specifically use the Sixth
Amendment to strike down the statute, the Court's due process discussion was
based on the statute's interference with counsel's decisions.2 3 Similarly, an open
hearing for expert funding forces an attorney to choose between revealing the
defense strategy or sacrificing the client's constitutional right to expert or
investigative assistance. 4 Additionally, each time the defense hires an expert
who uncovers evidence that is adverse to the defendant's case, the failure to
notify the prosecution that it intends to introduce the expert at trial will alert the
prosecution that the expert may have uncovered evidence favorable to its own
case.225 Thus, open hearings force the defense to be more conservative in
217. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984).
218. 466 U.S. 648 (1984).
219. United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648,663-66 (1984); see alsoAvery v. Alabama, 308 U.S.
444, 447-53 (1940) (rejecting the defendant's claim that appointing counsel three days prior to a
capital trial was not per se ineffective assistance of counsel).
220. Cronic, 466 U.S. at 659-60. Note that Cronids standard only determines whether govern-
ment interference in the defense counsel's performance resulted in per se ineffectiveness such that
the court need not inquire into the attorney's performance. Id. at 659 n.26. Otherwise, the court
will look to counsel's specific performance to determine whether, under Strickland, the defendant
received ineffective assistance of counsel. Id.
221. Id. at 659.
222. Brooks, 406 U.S. at 612-13.
223. See id. ("By requiring the accused and his lawyer to make that choice without an opportu-
nity to evaluate the actual worth of their evidence, the statute restricts the defense-particularly
counsel-in the planning of its case.").
224. See United States v. Abreu, 202 F.3d 386, 388 (1 st Cir. 2000) ("Because the government
was present [at a hearing to provide the defendant funding for an evaluation by a licensed psycholo-
gist], defense counsel declined to place on the record certain confidential matters that formed part
of the basis for the application.').
225. See supra notes 41-62 and accompanying text (elaborating on the strategic advantages to
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investigation and strategy and may cause defense attorneys to pursue a particular
line of defense only when they are confident that it will prove favorable to their
client. 6 Just as the statute in Brooks forced attorneys to decide whether to
present the testimony "without an opportunity to evaluate the actual worth of
their evidence," an open hearing for expert funding forces defense attorneys to
decide whether or not to introduce expert testimony before they can assess its
worth. 7
Open hearings for mitigation expert funds may force defense attorneys to
forgo a particular line of mitigation investigation because they do not want to
alert the prosecution to the existence of evidence that may ultimately prove
unfavorable."8  The United States Supreme Court's opinions in Williams v.
Taylor 9 and Wiggins v. Smitb30 establish that counsel has an " 'obligation to
conduct a thorough investigation of the defendant's background.' ,,3 In order
for counsel's decision to forgo a particular line of mitigation to be deemed
reasonable under Stricklands performance prong, counsel must first have
conducted a thorough mitigation investigation.232 Open hearings for mitigation
expert funds may force defendants to sacrifice certain mitigation strategies
without investigating their viability and thereby prevent attorneys from
thoroughly investigating their clients' backgrounds. Given that Wiggins and
Williams require a reasonable mitigation investigation in order for capital
counsel's performance to be effective, a practice that routinely dissuades counsel
from investigating their clients' backgrounds may constitute a state-imposed
impediment to effective assistance of the sort that would be presumed prejudicial
under Croni.233
Further, an open hearing for expert funding intrudes into the attorney-client
relationship. The Court in Weatberford v. Bursel34 rejected the plaintiff's claim
the prosecution of open hearings for expert funding).
226. Id.
227. Brooks, 406 U.S. at 612; see Giannelli, supra note 214, at 1409 (urging that attorneys must
be unfettered in deciding whether to obtain an expert to assist the defense).
228. See smpra notes 60-62 and accompanying text (explaining that open hearings for investiga-
tive funds may result in more conservative defense strategy).
229. 529 U.S. 362 (2000).
230. 539 U.S. 510 (2003).
231. Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510,522 (2003) (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362,396
(2000)).
232. Wiggins, 539 U.S. at 522-23; see Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687 (holding that an attorney's
performance violates a defendant's right to effective assistance of counsel when the performance
was deficient and the deficient performance prejudiced the defendant).
233. See Cronic, 466 U.S. at 659-60 (concluding that prejudice is presumed if a government
practice burdens counsel's performance to the extent that it causes a breakdown in the adversarial
process).
234. 429 U.S. 545 (1977).
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that a government informer's presence during private conversations with his
criminal defense attorney violated his right to effective assistance of counsel
because in that instance the informer had not conveyed any of the confidential
information to the prosecution. 35 The Court, however, implied that intentional
state intrusion into attorney-client communications may violate the defendant's
right to effective assistance of counsel in some cases.236 The Court was
concerned that the fear of government intrusion would affect counsel's ability
to communicate effectively with the client.237 The prosecution's presence at a
hearing for expert funding, while not an illicit intrusion, still allows the
prosecution to discover preliminary defense strategies that are the product of
attorney-client communications and to which the prosecution could not
otherwise gain access. 38 The defense is prejudiced by the disclosures in the way
that the defendant in Bursy was not, namely that the prosecution receives a
wealth of attorney-client information directly for use at trial.13 ' Further, an open
hearing may chill attorney-client communications because the decision not to
retain an expert may inhibit the defense from obtaining certain information
about the defendant that only an expert would be able to solicit.24
Although the Cronic standard for ineffective assistance of counsel is difficult
to meet, an open hearing for expert funding may qualify in light of the various
ways in which it prevents an attorney from performing effectively.2 4' Further,
various state courts have noted that an open hearing for expert funding
implicates a defendant's right to effective assistance of counsel.242 The
235. Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 552-53 (1977); see also Georgia v. McCollum, 505
U.S. 42, 58 (1992) (determining that there is no per se ineffective assistance of counsel when the
court requires attorneys to give a race-neutral reason for their peremptory strikes).
236. Bursy, 429 U.S. at 552, 556.
237. Id. at 554 n.4; see Note, Government Intrusions into the Defense Camp: Undermining the Right to
Counsel, 97 HARV. L. REv. 1143, 1143 (1984) [hereinafter Government Intrusions] (arguing that an
essential element of the right to counsel is the right to private communications with the attorney).
238. See VA. SuP. CT. R. 3A:1 1(c) (requiring defendants to disclose materials to the prosecution
that they intend to introduce or proffer at trial); Bursry, 429 U.S. at 554-55 (noting that the attorney-
client privilege only extends to disclosures from communications that would not otherwise have
been brought forth at trial); Government Intrusions, supra note 237, at 1144-45 (arguing that the
Government must prove its case without the aid of information that the defendant provides against
his will).
239. See Burey, 425 U.S. at 555 (noting that the information obtained by the informer was not
used by the prosecution at trial).
240. Government Intrusions, supra note 237, at 1145 (noting that the chill in the attorney-client
relationship that concerned the Court in Bursqy occurs when the attorney does not receive as much
information from the client as he would without the challenged discovery procedure).
241. See Cronic, 466 U.S. at 659 (concluding that per se ineffective assistance of counsel results
when the situation is such that no lawyer could provide effective assistance of counsel).
242. SeeMoody, 684So. 2d at 120 (noting that an open hearing for expert funding would result
in the "[d]isclosure of the defense's trial strategy [and] would impair the indigent defendant's right
to effective assistance of counsel"); Stevens, 770 N.E.2d at 759 (citing interference with counsel's
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combination of the outside government influence on counsel's decisions, forcing
counsel to make choices without the opportunity to fully assess the client's
needs, inhibiting counsel's ability to conduct a mitigation investigation, and the
chilling effect on the attorney-client relationship all seriously burden counsel's
effectiveness.
143
2. Fight to Compulsory Process
A defendant's Sixth Amendment right to compulsory process requires
'that criminal defendants have the right to the government's assistance in
compelling the attendance of favorable witnesses at trial and the right to put
before a jury evidence that might influence the determination of guilt.' ,2" The
defendant in Taylor v. Illinois5 asserted that a statute that permitted courts to
prohibit the defense from calling witnesses if it did not disclose them prior to
trial violated his right to compulsory process.24 The Court in Taylorbalanced the
defendant's interest in introducing witnesses with the Government's interests in
preventing eleventh-hour defenses and excluding unreliable evidence from
trial.247 The Court determined that "[t]he State's interest in the orderly conduct
preparation as a reason for permitting defendants to receive an ex parte hearing upon a showing of
good cause); Ballard, 428 S.E.2d at 180 ("A hearing open to the State necessarily impinges upon the
defendant's right to the assistance of counsel and his privilege against self-incrimination."); Wilkams,
958 S.E.2d at 193 (noting that pretrial discovery resulting from an open hearing implicates assistance
of counsel concerns by interfering with the defense attorney's work product).
243. See Cronic, 466 U.S. at 658-62 (noting that a Sixth Amendment violation may occur when
government action results in a complete breakdown of the adversarial process); Bursey, 425 U.S. at
556-57 (determining that the intentional invasion by the state into the attorney-client relationship
may violate a defendant's right to effective assistance of counsel); Brooks, 406 U.S. at 612-13 (noting
concerns with the Tennessee statute's effect on counsel's ability to assist the defendant).
244. Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400,408 (1988) (quoting Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39,
56 (1987)); see also Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302 (1973) ('Few rights are more
fundamental than that of an accused to present witnesses in his own defense.").
245. 484 U.S. 400 (1988).
246. Taylor, 484 U.S. at 410-16.
247. Id. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in Fendler v. Goldsmith
analyzed a compulsory process argument by assessing "the effectiveness of less severe sanctions,
the impact of witness preclusion on the evidence at trial and the outcome of the case, the extent to
which the prosecution will be surprised or prejudiced by the witness's testimony, and whether the
violation of discovery rules was willful or in bad faith." Fendler v. Goldsmith, 728 F.2d 1181, 1187
(9th Cir. 1983); see also John Stocker, Sixth Amendment--Predusion of Defense Witnesses and the Sixth
Amendment's Compulsory Process Clause Right to Present a Defense, 79 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 835,
861-64 (1988) (arguing that Fendkrprovides a better analytical framework than Taylor for assessing
compulsory process claims against rules precluding the introduction of witnesses for failure to
disclose them prior to trial).
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of a criminal trial" justifies the imposition of rules that exclude certain types of
evidence and thus rejected the defendant's contention.24
In applying Taylors test to open hearings for expert funding, courts should
balance the defendant's interest in obtaining and presenting expert witnesses at
trial with the State's interest in the orderly conduct of criminal trials.2 49 An open
hearing for expert funding may deter a defendant from retaining an expert
witness or investigator and thereby prevent the defense from developing all the
relevant facts of the case.250 Mitigation specialists are the only defense team
members with the training necessary to elicit all relevant mitigating evidence
from a defendant's background.25 ' The same is true for investigators, whose
training specific to investigating crimes makes them essential members of the
defense team.25 2 Further, a defendant's interest in introducing expert witnesses
is particularly high because expert witnesses often testify to crucial facts and
theories, testimony that a lay witness would have difficulty duplicating.
2 3
Providing defendants with the right to an ex parte hearing would not foster
eleventh-hour defenses or be inefficient. 25" The hearing could be relatively
informal in a judge's chambers, costing the state no more, and most likely less,
than a full-blown adversarial hearing in court.2"' Further, an ex parte hearing
only temporarily prevents the prosecution from receiving appropriate discovery
information because Virginia's discovery rules compel the defense to disclose its
defenses and expert witness information prior to trial.25 6 Accordingly, an open
hearing for expert funding violates the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to
248. Taylor, 484 U.S. at 411.
249. See id. at 410-11 (balancing state and private interests to assess whether a particular
government practice infringes on the defendant's right to compulsory process).
250. See Lee, supra note 7, at 184-85 (explaining that an open hearing burdens a defendant's
right to present a defense).
251. See Daniel L. Payne, Builhng the Case for Life: A Mitigation Spedalist as a Necessiy and a
Matter of Right, 16 CAP. DEF. J. 43, 48-52 (2003) (explaining that a mitigation expert performs
services that no other member of the defense team can duplicate).
252. See ABA GUIDELINES, supra note 77, at § 4.1 cmt. (explaining that an investigator's
specialized training makes him or her an indispensable member of the defense team).
253. See Jeffrey Robinette, Note, Montana v. Egelhoff: Abandoning a Defendant's Fundamental
Right to Present a Defense, 46 CATH. U. L. REv. 1349, 1367 (1997) (noting that a defendant's interest
in a witness's presence increases with the importance of the witness's testimony).
254. See Taylor, 484 U.S. at 411-12 (providing that the State has a strong interest in promoting
an efficient trial and preventing the introduction of eleventh-hour defenses).
255. See supra notes 164-67 and accompanying text (arguing that ex parte hearings will not
waste state funds); Giannelli, supra note 214, at 1403-04 (rejecting the proposition that any eco-
nomic concerns would result from an ex parte hearing for expert funding).
256. See VA. SUP. CT. R. 3A:11(c) (providing that the Commonwealth may obtain expert
reports that the defense intends to introduce at trial if the defense asks the Commonwealth to
provide their scientific reports or other evidence material to the defense).
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compulsory process because the defendant's interest in presenting a defense
outweighs the State's interest in being present at the hearings.
1I/. Summagy and Conclusion
Through either judicial decision or statute, Virginia should require courts
to permit defendants to apply ex parte for expert funds. Ideally, Virginia would
create a central public defender system that has discretion over the distribution
of expert funds for both public defenders and court-appointed attorneys. This
system would protect the disclosure of the defense's strategy from the
prosecution and relieve the trial judge of entanglement in the defense's strategy.
Absent such a system, the Virginia legislature should adopt a statute similar to
South Carolina's and permit defendants to apply ex parte for all experts and
investigators.257 A possible addition would permit the defendant to request that
a judge other than the trial judge hear the defendant's request for funds.
The case law in Virginia that holds that defendants are not entitled to an ex
parte hearing is based on O'Dell.258 The court in O'Dell concluded that def-
endants have no right to apply ex parte for expert assistance because defendants
have no right to a state-paid non-mental health expert at trial. 259 However
Husske rejected O'Dells reasoning when it held that defendants do have the right
to a non-mental health expert upon a showing of need.26" Thus, the court's
subsequent holdings in Ramdass and Weeks are based on an invalid premise, and
consequently, the question of whether Virginia courts should permit ex parte
applications for expert funds may still be viewed as an open one.
Further, open hearings for expert funds pose numerous constitutional
problems. Courts may violate a defendant's privilege against self-incrimination
when they force the defendant to choose between disclosing information that
could "furnish a link in the chain of evidence needed to prosecute the claimant"
and retaining an expert necessary for the defense.26' An open hearing implicates
a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to assistance of counsel because it forces
the defense to choose between revealing strategy to the prosecution and
retaining an expert. This choice obstructs an attorney's ability to make
independent decisions about the defense and causes a breakdown in the
adversarial process. Also, the choice between revealing defense strategy and
257. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-26 (Law. Co-op. 2003).
258. See Ramdass, 437 S.E.2d at 571 (citing O'Delland concluding that defendants have no right
to apply ex parte for expert funds).
259. 0 Del, 364 S.E.2d at 499.
260. See Husske, 476 S.E.2d at 925 (holding that due process requires the court to appoint an
expert for an indigent defendant an expert upon a showing of need and prejudice).
261. Hoffman, 341 U.S. at 486.
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retaining an expert witness unduly burdens the defendant's right to obtain
witnesses under the Sixth Amendment.
Evaluation of contemporary practice as well as of the private and state
interests at stake reveal that open hearings for expert assistance violate
defendants' due process rights. Finally, the burden an open hearing places on
indigent defendants, when monied defendants face no such burden, raises equal
protection concerns. Although there is no clear consensus among state courts
as to which constitutional argument is the most compelling, almost every court
has discussed the right in terms of due process. Further, the balancing test the
United States Supreme Court uses for compulsory process claims is more
flexible than the tests for effective assistance of counsel or self-incrimination,
and therefore, may be more persuasive to state courts.
Finally, the clear trend among states is to permit ex parte application for
expert funds. The majority of death penalty jurisdictions provide defendants
with at least a partial right to apply ex parte for expert assistance through case
law or statute. Although some jurisdictions have case law specifically rejecting
the right to an ex parte hearing, many judges in those states nevertheless
routinely permit ex parte application as a matter of discretion. Moreover, many
state public defender systems are structured such that defendants do not apply
to courts for expert funding, and thus the issue does not arise in those states.
In its report on Virginia's indigent defense system, the American Bar
Association was struck by "the complete inadequacy of access by public
defenders and court-appointed counsel to court-approved experts and a similar
inadequacy of access of court appointed counsel to court-approved
investigators."262 By routinely conducting open hearings for expert funds, courts
add another layer to defendants' difficulties in retaining expert assistance.
Although this procedural flaw should be cured by the legislature, the courts also
have the power to remedy it. Attorneys must urge courts to change their
procedures concerning open hearings. Without such a provision, indigent
defendants will continue to be robbed of the ability "to participate meaningfully
in a judicial proceeding in which [their] liberty is at stake.
263
262. VIRGINIA INDIGENT DEFENSE REPORT, supra note 3, at 59.
263. Ake, 470 U.S. at 76.
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